It seems that Jafü 3, Oberst Werner Junck (described by BP as “one ‘Junck’ of ZG 76”) thought Adlertag had gone well as far as the Bf 110s were concerned. There was perhaps an element of professional rivalry in his order to tell all air and ground crew that Zerstörer units had shot down 32 hostile aircraft for eight losses of their own while the single-engined fighters had brought down 10 and lost four:

These results, achieved under most difficult weather and operating conditions, are noteworthy. Such achievements have already contributed considerably to the defeat of English fighter activity.

The bomber force perhaps found less reason for self-congratulation. On the morning of the 14th, KG 54 filed a request for replacement aircraft to make good losses. This was only intercepted in part:

I./KG 54

Missing: 4 Ju 88 (W.Nr. 8084, 4098, 4084 and 4083)

Crashed on landing on return from operation, over 40% damage: 3 Ju 88 (W.Nr. 4046, 4087 and 2083)

II./KG 54

Missing: at least 1 Ju 88 missing (W.Nr. 610 … [the report became unintelligible at this point but the following seem likely to be from II./KG 54 as well]

Missing: 2 Ju 88 (W.Nr. 3117 and 6096)

Crashed on landing on return from operation, over 40% damage: 2 Ju 88 (W.Nr. 3119 and 3108)

That Adlertag had miscarried may also be inferred from IV. Fliegerkorps’ order (not deciphered until the night of 15/16 August) that on the 14th its units were to repeat their attacks of the previous afternoon with the same targets and numbers of aircraft. The 3.(F)/31 and 3.(F)/121 were to carry out weather reconnaissance between Start Point and Exeter and north of Poole respectively, reporting by 04.30 hrs. at the latest and the attacking force should be standing by at readiness state 1 from 06.00.

Another apparent setback was the cancellation of an operation code-named LUDWIG, originally intended for the afternoon of 14 August: JG 2 and KG 54 were advised of this by V. Fliegerkorps at 12.30 hours. At the same time IV. Fl.Kps. notified ZG 2 that LUDWIG was called off.

The same day, III./JG 2 sought the replacement of a Regierungsinspektor Godemann because of the “exceptional demands” currently being made on fighter units. In the same vein, the Geschwader Kommodore, Oberstlt. von Bülow made a particular request that only specially well-trained replacement pilots should be sent “to avoid losses of personnel and material.” (Later intercepts revealed that the Geschwader had been allocated 15 men, not all of them ready for operations).

Nor was Göring himself entirely happy at the way operations had developed for on 16 August he issued (in Bletchley Park’s words) “strict orders” that:

(1) Not more than one officer may fly in an aircraft;

(2) Officers of the rank of Geschwaderkommodore upwards may not take part in any operations during bad weather by single bomber or dive-bomber aircraft. Except in KG 27, Geschwaderkommodore may not take part in night operations, apart from exceptional cases.

(3) Young crews may not take part in operations in which expected enemy opposition will require fighting experience. If, however, young men do take part, they may perform only the simpler tasks and are not to be placed in aircraft at the rear of a formation.


On 12 October OKW was presented with statistics showing what three months of the “intensified air war against England” had done to the Luftwaffe's front line:



Serviceable aircraft


















10 Aug.


10 Oct.


















































[not stated]















































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