(Page 68) First Steps

As was common in pre-digital offices, the General der Aufklärungsflieger (Gen.d.A.) maintained a log of incoming and out going correspondence, summarising the contents of communications which no longer survive. Though sometimes cryptic and hard to read, a number of 1944’s entries touch on introduction of the Me 262 in the reconnaissance role.

On 2 August 1944 G.d.A. was advised by the General der Kampfflieger that two Me 262s from the next delivery would be going to Kommando Braunegg. The Versuchsverband OKL sent a telegram to Gen.d.A. on 1 September about the taking over of one or more Me 262s by Einsatz Kommando Braunegg. A telegram of 26 October appeared to be asking Maj. Schultze, acting Kommandeur of NAGr. 6, whether Me 262 reconnaissance in the West could be undertaken as an adjunct to KG 51’s operations. The reply next day was in the affirmative, Kdo. Braunegg’s photographic section was ordered to ‘the operational airfield’ and more Me 262s were ordered to be readied for action. All this probably reffered Kdo. Braunegg’s subsequent deployment to Schwåbisch Hall, the base of II./KG 51’s Me 262s until late December.

On 9 December it seems that G.d.A. expected to receive four more Me 262s in the coming week and the Versuchsverband was duly notified.

Source: Bundesarchiv RL 16-1/53: General der Aufklärungsflieger, Brieftagebuch mit Vernichtungsvermerken (Mai 1943–-März 1945)

Me 262s were first allocated to the Erprobungskommando General der Aufklärungsflieger (one aircraft on each date) on 19, 20 and 21 September 1944. NAGr. 6 was assigned an Me 110 G-4 (for twin-engined training) on 25 November, followed by two Me 262 A-2 Schul (machines limited to 800 km/h) on 28 and 30 November respectively. On 9 December it seems that G.d.A. expected to receive four more Me 262s in the coming week and the Versuchsverband OKL was notified accordingly. On the 27th an Me 262 A-1 went to ‘Kdo. Brauneck’ but NAGr. 6 would not be assigned its first Me 262 A-4s until 13 February 1945.

Monthly totals of aircraft assigned were:

Sources: Bundesarchiv RL 2-III/619: Flugzeuge: Tägliche Zuweisungen an die Luftflotten etc..- Halbmonatslisten VO-LE, Bd. 9 (Juli–Dez. 1944)

Bundesarchiv RL 2-III/620: Flugzeuge: Tägliche Zuweisungen an die Luftflotten etc..- Halbmonatslisten VO-LE, Bd. 10 (Feb–Apr. 1945)

Bundesarchiv RL 16-1/53: General der Aufklärungsflieger, Brieftagebuch mit Vernichtungsvermerken (Mai 1943–-März 1945)

(Page 70) December 1944

Oberleutnant Braunegg submitted a report to Gen.d.A. covering the experiences of Sonderkommando Panther during December 1944.

In its six days of operations up to and including the 27th, his Kommando had put up 24 sorties against the enemy. These had comprised 10 missions in Rotte strength and four flights by lone aircraft. Rotten were preferred as a lone was vulnerable to susprise attack, above all during the climb.

Average flight duration had been 55 minutes (to allow a safety margin for landing) and considerations of fuel consumption had meant altitudes 5,000–7,000 m. Minimum visibility for take-off and landing was 5 km; speeds were to be given in a follow-up report which does not seem to have survived.

Visual reconnaissance seemed possible during Rotte operations but would need to be explored further, one more of the standard mass-production machines had been allocated. Photo-reconnaissance had been carried out flawlessly, films proving very easy to evaluate. Difficulties had arisen from the pilot’s poor downward view which, it was suggested, could be remedied with a periscope. Pilots had navigated by normal dead-reckoning after detailed flight preparation. Return to the home airfield was made significantly easier by Tornado D/F. The Y-guidance proposed by Luftwaffenkommando West has not been carried out as the system has not been released for reconnaissance aircraft.

Anti-aircraft fire had only been encountered on one operation: the Me 262 had been at 5,500 m and while the shots had been accurate in altitude they had fallen fell at least 100 m behind the aircraft, at the same altitude. One aircraft flying alone had encountered with eight Mustangs at 5,500 m; passed off favourably despite weapons failure thanks to the aircraft’s superior performance. This mention of weapons failure confirms that at least one of the Kommando’s jets was armed.

No significant new technical defects had been experienced but there had been ignition difficulties at start-up. The pressure-oil provided probably contained water and ice crystals formed in cold weather, causing problems with the hydraulics. Air-to-air communication was bad owing to inadequate calibration of the sets delivered and subsequent calibration had brought only limited success. Air-to-ground traffic was only achievable out to 70 km and so the Immediate provision of a ‘SADIR’ 200 Watt VHF transmitter was considered essential on operational grounds. [SADIR was the acronym for French electronics manufacturer, Société Anonyme des Industries Radioélectriques].

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