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Overnight on the 19/20th, 12 aircraft of Gefechtsverband Helbig undertook an ‘operation with Wasserballons (Oder)’ which targeted the bridges at Alt-Blessin (Stary Błeszyn) and Groß Neuendorf but again poor visibility over the following days precluded any visual or photographic reconnaissance to assess the damage. Unless they were dropped shortly before sunrise, the weapons concerned are unlikely to have been the Flam C 250 whose fuses needed daylight to work. More probable is the contact-fused Kugeltreibmine 41 (see above).

At 1010 hrs on the 23rd, Hptm. Bechtle of Lfl. 6 Ops. had spoken on the telephone to the base commander at Prague-Rusin (Ruzyne). This established that to the latter’s knowledge Oberleutnants Schäfer and Harthel had yet to arrive at the airfield but Uffz. Merk was present. The day before he had been ordered by the Luftgau VIII Quartermaster to load Wasserballons aboard a Ju 52 but without any proviso that personnel must accompany them. For this reason, ferrying over to Neubiberg by Uffz. Merk had not taken place. Bechtle relayed the order to keep Merk available to fly to Neubiberg in a Fi 156 and for the commander to clarify whether a Storch was either on hand or could be detained. He should also give the Fieseler’s unit and confirm that the Transportfliegerführer, Maj. Erich Zähr, was in the loop. The latter was to ensure that the delivery took place and to liaise with Rusin as necessary. A handwritten annotation to typed file note betrays exasperation:

If a man is on his way with 18 WB [Wasserballons] and the movement order comes for these WB, then … the escort, that is to say Uffz. Merk, must go with them. It’s cowardice to try and shift the blame on to the OQ [Chief Quartermaster]!

At 2120, Oberleutnants Barthel and Schäfer had not arrived in Prague-Rusin and Lfl. 6 urgently requested that both come ‘here’ with construction diagrams for the Wasserballon, which Lfl. 6 was considering making in its own area. There had also also been thought of using six ’self-sacrifice crews’ against the bridges in Ju 88s but Lw.Kdo. Nordost advised that evening that no such men were available, just five Ju 88s without crews. As for the Luftflotte’s request for Ju 88s able to carry Wasserballon, these were still being fitted out and would be ready to ferry over in two or three days. The telegram about this was annotated by at least three other hands querying whether any ‘self-sacrifice’ crews were available in the southern area; proposing that the Ju 88s only be made ready when a request was made; and that someone had advised on 27 April that no ‘self-sacrifice’ crews were on hand.

»Unternehmen Gertrud«

Another Wasserballon operation was planned during April; codenamed Unternehmen Gertrud, a projected attack on Soviet hydro-electric plants by a force of by 12 Ju 290s. Presumably the aim was that the Wasserballons should explode as they were carried into the ducts serving the generator turbines (as with the intended use of BM 1000 mines as an adjunct to Eisenhammer). No details appear to survive about how many and what calibre of Wasserballon might have been carried by the Ju 290, a type rarely if ever used for bombing although some variants had external racks able to take a combined load of 3,000 kg. However, on 14 April the Luftwaffe General Staff noted that six of the 12 aircraft assigned to Gertrud had been destroyed by Allied air attacks and decided to cancel all preparations for the mission as it no longer had any chance of succeeding.

Two days later, it was decided that 2./FAGr. 5 should finally be disbanded, an idea with a convoluted history. Back in July 1944, FAGr. 5 had been ordered to detach three Ju 290s to KG 200 for ‘some considerable time’ and, with the Allies advancing from Normandy, the remainder of the Gruppe was withdrawn to Mühldorf am Inn on 21 August. After this its aircraft seem to have been dispersed across Bavaria; the three detached crews took part in long-range supply and agent-dropping missions but the dire fuel situation precluded any regular employment for the others. On 27 January 1945, FAGr. 5 requested the immediate transfer of an officer to the Gruppe at Neubiberg for operations. Addressed at Neubiberg on 21 February, Maj. Fischer (Kommandeur of FAGr. 1) was informed that he and 2./FAGr. were subordinated to KG 200 ‘for the duration of two special operations’. On the evening of the 26th, a 2. Staffel signal told the 1. Staffel in Stavanger, Norway that four aircraft were ready for operations (not specified in the message) but their engines had only been run on the the ground and Luftflotte Reich yet to authorise their being fuelled-up. Minutes later, Obltn. Müller (probably Hans Müller, FAGr. 5’s Technical Officer) notified KG 200 at Stendal that was Pocking aerodrome still lacked orders to hand over ‘the two aircraft’, leaving operational readiness by the 28th in doubt. The next signal advised that just 2 cbm of C3 were on hand for a test run another five were urgently needed to ensure readiness for operations. Oberstleutnant Werner Baumbach, KG 200’s Kommodore and Fliegerführer 200, issued a succession of orders on 12 March deploying signals units to Tutow, Barth, Rechlin and Neubrandenburg, adding that directives covering the roles of I./KG 66, II./KG 4 and 2. FAGr. 5 were to follow. All this probably had to do with Unternehmen Eisenhammer, a projected Mistel operation against Soviet power stations and on the 25th it was announced that FAGr. 5’s disbandment was postponed pending completion of ‘a special task’. As a result, the planned disbandment of the 2. Staffel was postponed.

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