At Bevergern, south of Rheine, Ltn. Walter Roth was slighlty hurt while attempting a crash landing after engine failure which may have been attributable to an attack by the Tempest flown by F/S Jackson of No. 56 Squadron. His Me 262 A-2 (W.Nr. 170281, 9K+FL) was 70% damaged.

The British learned of Roth’s crash in an eight-point proforma (see above) forming the second part of a fragmentary decrypt whose first section had consisted only of “8) Not Known.” This probably referred to the loss of Fw. Herbert Lenke (W.Nr. 170108, 9K+WL) who fell in the Nijmegen area, either to AA or the tempest of No. 56 Squadron’s F/S Jackson.

A week earlier, I./KG 51 had told the Geschwader’s IV. Gruppe of its urgent need for pilots and had learned on the 4th how many of those with the replacement training unit were operationally ready. Now the instruction was given to send them to the I. Gruppe “at once.” Aircraft were also needed at the front and the depot detachment at Lechfeld advised that it would ferry the Kommodore’s aircraft, W.Nr. 110626 to Achmer after certain items had been installed. What those might be was revealed by a communication the following day, stating that there were seven Me 262s in Schwäbisch Hall with a Robot camera installed “at the back to the right” and in Lechfeld the same devices were being fitted to 10 more. There was a further signal from II./KG 51 on this subject:

In addition to the Robot fitting in the right hand side of the hatch under the tailplane, a small [word(s) missing] housing is to be fitted immediately on the diagonal surface above the head of the pilot, the camera facing to port from the cockpit roof. Actuation by the same press-button on the control column, with the addition of a tumbler switch for port or starboard operation as desired. Data for fitting will be sent by courier. Supplementary fitting of the aircraft [singular or plural?] is to be carried out.

The I. Gruppe’s operations for the day were:

12.45–13.14: three aircraft up “to harass the enemy fighter screen” in the Duisburg–Köln area.

12.45–13.58: four aircraft (three returned).

13.39–14.19: three aircraft.

These last two waves had been intended to bomb targets around Aachen but the weather was so bad that one jettisoned its bombs over Allied territory west of the Maas, the rest on an area set aside for the purpose. The aircraft which did not return to base was Ofw. Kohler’s W.Nr. 170080, 9K+RL. According to a report from Bletchley Park, an Me 262 A-2 of I./KG 51 was damaged in a belly landing on the 12th. Its Werk Nummer was received as “(smudge)90419” but that appears to be an error since no Me 262 series is known with 9 as its second digit.

Oberstleutnant Schenck drew several conclusions from the day’s effort which was “to be considered a failure.” The aircraft had been dispatched on the basis of a forecast that the weather (thick, low-lying cloud and showers) would improve after 11.00 hrs. This was mistaken and the problem was compounded by the first wave not reporting the actual conditions because the Schwarmführer had dropped out (see below). More caution was called for in future and failure due to technical damage was still too great for operations in bad weather. The 10.30 met report did not arrive until noon and telephone links were still poor, indeed “everything that has failed has been a question of communications.”

Schenck added that the reason for Kohler’s loss had not been ascertained. He had been part of the first bombing mission, when the weather was still “fairly good” and had 34 Me 262 operations to his credit. Evidently Kohler was the Schwarmführer mentioned above as “dropping out” as no other aircraft either landed early or failed to return. Kohler is now understood to have fallen to AA defences near Aachen.

The IV./KG 51 enquired whether, as well as the Kommodore’s +AA, +MA should also be ferried over to Neuburg as his second machine.

Fw. Trenke of II./KG 51 took off (from Schwäbisch Hall) at for Hopsten at 12.44 hrs. on the 14th but was forced to land his 9K+AP at Dülmen, without damage to either his aircraft or himself. Next day, KG 51’s Kommodore ordered the immediate transfer of the 4. and 5. Staffeln to Achmer as soon as the weather allowed; ground echelons were to travel by rail.

A message thought to be from II./KG 51 referred to Ltn. Lübcke’s death in a crash on this date. This pilot belonged to 6./KG 51 and was flying W.Nr. 110501 and may have been shot down by the OC of 122 Wing, W/C J.B. Wray, in a Tempest. It is worth pointing out that Wray had been pursuing his jet east from the Weert area and that it fell into the Rhein. If this was Lübcke’s aircraft, the 6. Staffel had lost no time between beginning its move north and venturing over Allied lines.

continued on next page …

PART FOUR OF FIVE