continued …

On 8 July, Châteaudun was told to prepare for a special operation which would require stocking up with a special fuel as per the arrangements given above. This led the Allies to conclude that the Me 262 was involved. However on the 29th two 5-tonne lorries carrying T-Stoff and Z-Stoff fuel were ordered to the same airfield under armed escort. The servicing platoon involved had previously been involved with rocket-assisted torpedoes and the Hs 293. On the 20th, I./KG 51 with 44 men was ordered to Lechfeld, a place British Intelligence already associated with the Me 262. Luftflotte 3’s position statement five days later also placed an advance party, “Vorkdo. Eins. Kdo. KG 51 (Schenk)”, at Châteaudun and on the 30th Einsatzkommando KG 51 reported that its wireless station was there but the signal said nothing about the presence of aircraft.

The OKL Führungsstab issued instructions to Luftflotte 3 on the necessity of dispersing Me 262s and Ar 234s in camouflaged bays well-protected against shrapnel; they must also be guarded to prevent espionage and sabotage. Gaining operational with these types was of decisive significance and so every effort must be made to prevent their destruction on the ground. In the air the jets were at their most vulnerable over the 15–20 km after take-off, when still at low level and for a similar distance when throttled back for landing and these stretches must be guarded by Flak lanes. If possible there should be fighter protection during take-off and landing. It is noteworthy that these weakpoints had been accurately foreseen before either type had become operational and many Ar 234s and Me 262s would be lost at just these times.

The OKL Führungsstab issued instructions to Lfl. 3 on the necessity of dispersing Me 262s and Ar 234s in camouflaged bays well-protected against shrapnel; they must also be guarded to prevent espionage and sabotage. Gaining operational with these types was of decisive significance and so every effort must be made to prevent their destruction on the ground. In the air the jets were at their most vulnerable over the 15–20 km after take-off, when still at low level and for a similar distance when throttled back for landing and these stretches must be guarded by Flak lanes. If possible there should be fighter protection during take-off and landing. It is noteworthy that these weakpoints had been accurately foreseen before either type had become operational and many Ar 234s and Me 262s would be lost at just these times.

By 9 August, orders were being given to the station commander at Châteaudun that either Juvincourt or Coulommiers was to be stocked with J2, and that the latter was viewed as a rear airfield. Creil also was to receive only what was operationally necessary, and would be the new destination for a group of tanker lorries carrying 100 cbm of J2 previously intended for Montdidier and Rosières-en-Santerre. On the same day, Luftgau West France was told that all questions about the deployment of the Me 262 must be raised with the General der Kampfflieger. (Allied Intelligence commented that every previous reference but one to the type had been about reconnaissance). Next day, Lfl. 3 was told to use every means at its disposal to expedite operational readiness of “the new Me 262 airfields” which must be ready by 15 August at the latest. Apparently in this connection a telegram went from OKL to the Gen.d.Kampfflieger on 19 August: “To be submitted immediately! Confirming telephone conversation: aerodrome Juvincourt”.

On 15 August, OKL had corrected data given out six days earlier to Luftflotte 3 about an unspecified aircraft, which the Allies were clear was the Me 262: speed with empty bomb racks at 2500 m. was 795 km/h while its required landing area was 2000 m. During the evening of the 19th, Lfl. 3 ordered Creil aerodrome to be cleared of unneeded fuel and ammunition, and supplies for the Me 262 were to be sent straightaway to Coulommiers or Juvincourt, as the situation on the ground demanded (the latter was about 90 km. north east of the former, so at less immediate risk from the Allied breakout). Two days later, IX. Fliegerkorps reported that an unspecified airfield was suitable for operations and stocked with sufficient J2 for 17 missions. The distances between the aircraft dispersals and personnel quarters were a drawback however and Flak protection was confined to a single battery of 2 cm. guns. Fuel bowsers and tractors had been requested from the Aerodrome Regional Command at Laon (which, taken with subsequent developments, suggests that Juvinvourt was the base in question).

Luftflotte 3 was told by OKL on 22 August:

Bringing up of two Schwärme of Einsatzkommando Schenk [sic] to be expected in the next few days (about 24.8). Establish further operational and dispersal fields immediately so that necessary measures for stocking up can be set in motion. Establish fields’ operational readiness as rapidly as possible since operations are put in question if the present single airfield falls out of action. Report airfield to OKL, Füst Ia and Gen.d.Kampfl.

At 15.00 hrs. next day, it was announced that a Luftwaffe equipment depot with Me 262 parts was being dispatched to Creil, 45 km NNE of Paris. This was pursuant to an order given by Luftgau West France the previous day and brought the spares into the sphere of its neighbour, LG Belgium/North France.

continued on next page…

PART TWO OF SIX