At 19.00 hrs. the Commanding General of the Luftwaffe in Italy filed his regular strength return. This included a new unit whose name the British translated as “Special Staff Götz”, consisting of one Ar 234 B-2 and its pilot.

In his Flugbuch Stfw. Walter Arnold recorded a 65-min. flight from Oranienburg to Münchem-Riem in T9+FH, taking off at 08.20 hrs. Either this entry or the message of 22 February (see above) must have been incorrect. If his Flugbuch is accurate, Arnold had not flown since 15 February when he took off from Sagan-Küpper (Zagan, Poland) with auxiliary tanks on a reconnaissance taking in Breslau (Wroclaw) and Pozen (Poznan).

From Oranienburg, the Versuchsverband ordered Kdo. Hecht to prepare to transfer to Osoppo while Erich Sommer himself was to fly that day to Kaltenkirchen, via Rheine. A memo from the same source told Kdo. Sommer to expect (or to obtain?) the "most important spare parts" by lorry from the nearest equipment issuing station, "for transfer of Sommer." The "transfer" presumably means his move to Kaltenkirchen and it is notable that Sommer was addressed as a Kommando rather than an individual, possibly a reference to "the remainder of the equipment and personnel" mentioned on 21 February (see above).

An Ofw. Lüders sent a message from Lechfeld to 1./Versuchsverband OKL in Oranienburg to say that his advance party had arrived at its destination at 15.00 hrs. on 16 February but that the “intended apparatuses” (apparently aircraft) had not yet arrived. When ferried over, they should not land at München-Riem but in Lechfeld where airfield conditions were good, but those at Osoppo were not yet known. Lüders added that Mensching and Biermann had arrived at 08.00 hrs.

Lüders’ isolated message is one more confusing element of a frequently tangled history. If he had been in Lechfeld for more than two weeks he should have been aware that Gniesmer had been there and gone, and perhaps that Stabsfw. Arnold was in Riem, so it seems that he was still expecting more than one aircraft, presumably those of the designated Kommandoführer and the fourth pilot whom Götz had told Sommer was to be assigned to the new Kommando.

Arnold logged a 65 km. flight from Riem to Lechfeld in T9+FH, though it seems unlikely that it could have taken the 30 minutes stated in his Flugbuch.

Oberleutnant Sommer was reported to have left for Biblis at 05.50 hours. This would seem to have been a return flight after visiting Kaltenkirchen.

At 12.15 hrs. 1.(F)/123 asked 1.(F)/100 when Obltn. Sommer had arrived and when he would take off for Lechfeld. The reply, 75 minutes later, was that he had arrived the previous day and would probably leave on the 13th.

This message concluded “column not yet ready for transport, has lorry left Ibbenbüren?” Since men and equipment of Kdo. Götz had already been put on a train from Münster to Italy almost three weeks earlier, it would be interesting to know what was still lacking that Biblis needed to make good. (Ibbenbüren is about 15 km east of Rheine and almost 400 km from Biblis). Erich Sommer did however recall to the author that his unit’s gear had been moved by road under Oblt. Manfred Mähnhard of the Versuchsverband.

The reference to "leaving for Lechfeld" indicates that the decision to send Sommer to Italy after all had been taken somewhere between 5 and 9 March, perhaps while he was in Kaltenkirchen.

Although intercepted signals or other contemporary documentation are lacking, these seem to have been a busy three days for Erich Sommer. First he recollected visiting Oranienburg on the 10th, where he had his aircraft fitted with a ventral fairing containing two MG 151/20 cannon, furnished by the Versuchsverband's small Ar 234 night fighter trials detachment. Next day he went by car to report to Gen.d.A. at Würzburg and, returning to Oranienburg, had his Arado's gunsight calibrated on the 12th.

A signal was intercepted saying that Oblt. Sommer was currently in Biblis but was to proceed to Lechfeld on 14 March.

According to Walter Arnold’s Flugbuch, he flew 295 km. from Lechfeld to Udine, landing at 11.00 hrs. He noted in the "remarks" column that he was now directly subordinated to NAG 11 and ultimately to the Kommandierender General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Italien.

In response to a telegram he had sent on 4 March, OB Südwest was told by OKL of its plans for aerial reconnaissance in Italy. The Ar 234s being brought in would take over the tasks of 2.(F)/122’s Me 410s and some of the roles of NAG 11’s Bf 109s. Therefore 2.(F)/122 as well as NAG 11’s Gruppenstab and 2. Staffel would be disbanded with immediate effect. By the end of April, OKL planned to have deployed 1.(F)/22 (which was currently re-equipping on the Ar 234) to Italy. When that Staffel arrived it would absorb Sommer’s Kommando.

1./Versuchsverband OKL in Oranienburg was notified that Sommer had flown from Biblis to Lechfeld and on to Osoppo.

Walter Arnold logged a 1516 km. reconnaissance of Ancona and San Benedetto, taking off at 08.20 and returning at 10.20 hours.

Biblis asked Oranienburg to advise right away whether Oblt. Wolf Loah was also to transfer to Osoppo but it was not until 27 March that Sommer signalled to Luftwaffenkommando West that the Commanding General in Italy was reserving to himself the disposal of the personnel and equipment of Loah’s column. Meanwhile Loah was to await further orders in Schwäbisch Hall.

According to Sommer, this officer was to have taken charge of the Kommando’s non-flying elements although Gen.d.A.’s war diary for 3 March 1945 has him posted to 3.(F)/33 for familiarisation as Staffelkapitän, then two weeks later that position was given to Hptm. Christian Jährig of 3.(F)/123.

The 1./Versuchsverband OKL was told that the transfer of ground elements would take place next day, British Intelligence evaluating this as information as connected to the deployment of Ar 234s to Italy. However Gen.d.A.’s war diary recorded that today Kdo. Sommer had arrived in Udine at full strength and was ready for operations.

Here again the surviving records let us down. Apart from a brief mention of Udine’s runway on 20 February, all the earlier signals traffic speaks of Osoppo. It was clear that there were reservations about the latter and especially its runway but when and by whom was the decision taken to base the Kommando at Udine-Campoformido (called Udine II by the Luftwaffe)? For that matter, why was Osoppo chosen in the first place? The absence of any intercepted communications with Germany on the subject suggests that the move to Campoformido was decided on by Luftwaffe commanders in Italy. Sommer himself wrote that he visited Osoppo the day after his arrival in Italy and found that it was “still not fit for us [because] the runway was still in the final stage of lengthening and blast pens were being built."

The Gen.d.A. noted that Oblt. Sommer had successfully flown an operational sortie. This is the first recorded mission by the Kommando.

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QUESTIONS

How did Leutnant Gniesmer occupy the two weeks between his arrival and Oberleutnant Sommer's? Did he lack either the support equipment or the authorisation to begin operations?