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The II. Fliegerkorps' orders of 16.45 on 22 July envisaged an attack on Luqa’s dispersals with delayed-action bombs from 22.15–22.30 by three aircraft of KG 54 with another six from KG 77 under command; 10 Italian bombers would follow up 2½ hours later; Noto would transmit between 21.15 and 03.30. At 20.40, the last minute, the two Geschwader were told to operate independently because “Caruso-Ju 88 unserviceable” (the original German can be read as singular or plural).

If the above was unknown to the British at the time, deciphered signals had nevertheless told them that on 8 July on a Caruso installation team was in Berlin, awaiting a flight to Greece. It was also known that on the afternoon of the 19th, Ob. Süd (C-in-C South) Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring had intended a raid on Maltese airfields and testing of “anti-night fighter apparatus”, next day an attack on the Suez anchorage was cancelled because its main target, the liner Queen Elizabeth, had left but another attempt was planned when the moon was more favourable and jammers had been fitted.

Before the month was out, at least six aircraft of II./KG 100 and ten of LG 1 had been equipped with jamming transmitters but even so some prisoners taken later in the year claimed Caruso had to be carried in a Ju 52 because the set and its batteries took up so much space. They said that for major night raids on Malta, a Catania-based Ju 52, with an antenna extending from cockpit to tail patrolled south of the island to jam night-fighter R/T. These captives also spoke of another transmitter which could be carried in a Ju 88 to jam night fighter A.I. Since Ju 88s could and did carry Caruso, the equipment aboard the Ju 52 was either a multiple installation or some other system entirely. The II. Fliegerkorps orders make it clear that the “Caruso-Ju 88” and the “air signals aircraft KG 54” were distinct so the latter was almost certainly the Ju 52. According to Dr. Scholz’s postwar interrogation, the Ju 52’s system was directed at the height-finding capability of British radars and so may have been what troubled the anti-aircraft GL sets.

An ASV aircraft operating over the waters off Malta and Sicily on the night of 14/15 July reported jamming, the interference often only affecting the antennae on one side, which could be alleviated by turning away. That the transmissions were directed toward Malta can be inferred from one report that the period from 20.15–00.40 [local time] “was spent approximately North of Sicily and the ASV was perfectly normal, no jamming being experienced”.

On 20 July, a Malta-based naval aircraft had reported jamming of its ASV but the Admiralty was unable to confirm that this was deliberate, suggesting it may have fallen foul of transmissions directed at RDF stations onshore. The same day, Fliegerkorps X in Greece had been asked to approve the transfer of a “signals Ju" marked WT+AO to Tobruk next day with the early morning convoy. It was to work with NJG 2 whose Signals Officer, Ltn. Schulz, would provide their instructions; after an operation in collaboration with the night fighters, it was to land in Crete although personnel and equipment would remain in Tobruk. On the night of the 31st the aerodrome at Heliopolis, Cairo was raided by six He 111 of KG 100 and 13 Ju 88 of LG 1; three of the former and six of the latter carried Caruso. Wing Commander Colin Cadell of the Air Ministry’s Signals and Wireless Intelligence Section noted that no jamming of either ground or airborne radars had been reported by the defenders but he asked his counterparts in the Middle East to confirm this:

… we should aim at having one or two bomber aircraft with each raid capable of jamming enemy main chain and gun control RDF … the time has arrived when we should be in a position both to counter jamming by the enemy and also to jam his RDF and R/T more effectively.

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